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Abstract
We reformulate the local stability analysis of market equilibria in a competitive market as a
local coordination problem in a market game, where the map associating market prices to
best-responses of all traders is common knowledge and well-deﬁned both in and out of
equilibrium. Initial expectations over market variables differ from their equilibrium values and
are not common knowledge. This results in a coordination problem as traders use the structure
of the market game to converge back to equilibrium. We analyse a simultaneous move and a
sequential move version of the market game and explore the link with local rationalizability.
r 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
JEL classification: C72; D50; D59
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1. Introduction
While there is, by now, an extensive literature on the non-cooperative foundations
of competitive equilibria,1 there has been very little work 2 on the non-cooperative
foundations for the stability analysis of competitive equilibria. This is surprising
given that the traditional analysis of stability3 of competitive equilibria suffers from
the problem that there is no explicit price formation rule that underpins the analysis
of competitive equilibria.
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In this paper, we take a ﬁrst step towards providing a non-cooperative foundation
for the stability analysis of competitive markets using market games whose non-
cooperative equilibria coincide with competitive equilibria. In a market game, the
map that associates market prices to the actions of all individuals is well-deﬁned both
out of equilibrium and at equilibrium. We reformulate the stability problem of
competitive equilibria as a coordination problem over the expectations that agents
have over market variables, like prices. We assume that initial expectations over
these market variables (a) differ from the equilibrium values of the same market
variables and (b) are not common knowledge. This creates a coordination problem
as traders try to use structure of the game to converge back to equilibrium. The
coordination problem is local when the initial expectations over market variables are
in the vicinity of their equilibrium values. The study of the resulting coordination
dynamics, in the vicinity of the market equilibrium, is also an analysis of the local
stability of competitive equilibria.
The model of non-cooperative exchange that we use belongs to a line of research
initiated by Shapley and Shubik [14].4 In this approach, each participant sends out
quantity signals, bids and offers of the commodities they own, which indicate how
much of each commodity they are willing to put up for trade. The market is modelled
as a mechanism that consists of a price formation rule and an allocation rule: after
receiving all the bids and offers, the mechanism determines prices and ﬁnal holdings
of each participant. In our set-up, there is a continuum of traders, two commodities
and single market in which traders exchange the two commodities. Traders make
bids in units of the ﬁrst commodity and offers in units of the second commodity. The
price formation rule sets the market price equal to the ratio of the aggregate bid of
commodity one over the aggregate offer of commodity two. The allocation rule,
then, assigns commodity bundles and two commodities. We study two versions of
the market game: the simultaneous move market game, where both bids and offers
are made simultaneously, and the sequential move market game, where offers are
made after the market (aggregate) bid is observed.
We require all participants in the market game to know the rules of the market
game, the strategy sets of players, their payoff functions. We also assume that it is
common knowledge that all agents respond to a market bid or offer by determining
their best response and that the best-responses of all other agents is known by every
participant. This ensures that the map which associates market prices to the best-
responses of all individuals is common knowledge in both variants of the market
game. In the simultaneous move market game, starting from rationalizability, we
describe the coordination problem over the heterogeneous expectations5 of agents
over the market price. In the sequential move market game, the coordination
problem is formulated over the expectations over the market bid for traders making
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5 Importantly, throughout this paper, we assume that agents have point expectations over market
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important topic we intend to pursue in future research.
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the ﬁrst move. This formulation of the coordination problem directly on
expectations over market variables allows us to focus on the competitive ﬂavour
of the market game. However, in the sequential move market game, we also show
that our approach to the coordination problem can be derived directly starting from
extensive-form rationalizability.
In this paper, for simplicity, we focus on economies where all traders have corner
endowments. This allows us to model a competitive market where any trader can
only act on one side of the market either as buyer or a seller.
We have two sets of results in this paper.
The ﬁrst set of results relate to the analysis of local coordination in the
simultaneous move market game. We derive the coordination dynamics with
heterogeneous expectations over the market price as consequence of local
rationalizability and derive conditions for its local stability. In the special case of
homogenous expectations, the local stability of the coordination dynamics requires
that the two sides of the market respond in a similar way to small changes in prices in
the vicinity of the equilibrium price; in other words, the difference between the
elasticity of market bids and the elasticity of market offers, evaluated at the
equilibrium price, is bounded. With heterogeneous expectations, we show that the
local coordination problem, in general, is harder to resolve than in the case
homogenous expectations. Nevertheless, the analysis in the two cases coincide when
all the traders belonging to one side of the market, respond in the same direction: all
traders on the same side of the market either increase (or decrease) the quantity, put
up for exchange, of the commodity they own. Moreover, by appropriately choosing
the speed of adjustment, the local stability of the classical discrete-time tatonnement
dynamics can be derived from (and in one case, made equivalent to) the coordination
dynamics with homogenous beliefs over the market price.
The second set of results relate to the analysis of local coordination in the
sequential move market game. In this part of the paper, we restrict attention to those
subgame perfect equilibria that sustain market equilibria. As a preliminary step, we
show that there exist subgame perfect equilibria, where market offers are described
by smooth offer functions, that sustain market equilibria. We focus on the
coordination problem faced by traders who make bids in the ﬁrst stage when they
anticipate that the offers in the second stage of the game are made according to these
smooth offer functions6 at the subgame perfect equilibrium. We, then, derive the
coordination dynamics when traders in the ﬁrst stage have homogenous beliefs over
the market bid. We show that when the two sides of the market move in opposite
directions in response to small changes in prices in the vicinity of the subgame perfect
(and competitive) equilibrium, local stability of the coordination dynamics in the
simultaneous move game with homogenous expectations implies the local stability of
the coordination dynamics in the sequential move game. Moreover, by example, we
also that local stability in the sequential move game may obtain while local stability
in the simultaneous move game does not. However, when the two sides of the market
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move in the same direction to small changes in prices, in the vicinity of the
equilibrium, the opposite conclusion goes through.
Next, we explore the link between local extensive-form rationalizability and the
coordination dynamics in the sequential move game. We show that whenever the
subgame perfect equilibria of the sequential move game is locally extensive-form
rationalizable, the coordination dynamics locally converges in the sequential move
game. Moreover, we also show that the local stability of the cobweb dynamics in the
competitive market coincides with the local stability of the coordination dynamics in
the sequential moves market game.
The paper which is closest to our approach is by Guesnerie [6]. There, in a one-
commodity, partial equilibrium model where all agents are price-takers, he
introduced the notion of eductive stability. In his analysis, individuals who supply
the commodity in question must choose the quantity they supply before prices adjust
to ensure market clearing, i.e. the quantity supplied to the market satisﬁes an
exogenously speciﬁed demand curve. This creates the possibility that the suppliers of
the commodity do not necessarily coordinate on the equilibrium price: if the
suppliers of the commodity have heterogeneous expectations of the market-clearing
price, they will need to revise their expectations in order to converge to the
equilibrium price. Although this analysis is a deﬁnite advance on the traditional
analysis of the stability of competitive equilibria, it suffers from the problem that it
rules out the possibility of coordination problems arising for a subset of participants,
namely those whose behaviour is summarized in the exogenously speciﬁed demand
curve. Moreover, the adjustment rule that associates the equilibrium price to the
actions of the suppliers of the commodity and allows the suppliers to revise
expectations, actually requires the existence of an exogenously speciﬁed demand
curve. Therefore, it is unclear how Guesnerie’s [6] analysis would extend to a
situation where all participants, on both sides of the market, may have to solve a
coordination problem. Moreover, our result on the equivalence of the local stability
of the cobweb dynamics with the local stability of the coordination dynamics in the
sequential moves market game also provides a strategic foundation for [6].
In the next section, we specify the model of the competitive market and the
simultaneous move and sequential move market game. Section 3 studies local
coordination in the simultaneous move market game; Section 4 is devoted to the
study of coordination in the sequential move market game. All proofs (unless
otherwise stated) and some of the more technical material are gathered in the
appendix.
2. The competitive market
We begin by specifying the fundamentals of the competitive market. The set of
agents consists of the interval I ¼ ½0; M: Formally, there is an atomless measure
space of individuals, fI ; i; mg; with i the s-algebra on I and m an atomless measure
deﬁned on I : Null sets of individuals are systematically ignored throughout the
ARTICLE IN PRESS
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paper. A commodity bundle is xAR2þ: For some ﬁnite-dimensional Euclidean space
R k; an assignment is any function x : I-R k each coordinate of which is integrable.
There are two types of individuals, I1; I2; of measure m1 and m2 respectively, m1 þ
m2 ¼ M; which partitions I : There is a ﬁxed initial assignment of commodities,
w : I-R2þ; the endowments of individuals with w
i ¼ ðwi1; 0Þ; for all iAI1 and w j ¼
ð0;w j2 Þ; for all jAI2 and %wl ¼
R
wnl dnc0 for l ¼ 1; 2; where the range of the integral,
the set I ; has been suppressed for convenience. Preferences of trader n are described
by a utility function un :R2þ-R: We make the following assumptions throughout
the paper on utility functions:
A1(i). For each trader nAI ; un satisﬁes strict monotonicity and is smooth with
ðun1; un2Þc0 and u
n
11
un
21
un
12
un
22
 
is negative deﬁnite on R2þþ;
A1(ii). For each trader nAI ; limx1-0 u
n
1ðxÞ ¼ limx2-0 un2ðxÞ ¼N;
A2. The family of utility functions fung is uniformly smooth.
The requirement of uniform smoothness in (A2) follows Aumann [2, Sections 4
and 10] except that we do not require the utility functions of any trader to be
bounded (Aumann [2, p. 630, footnote 26]). A consequence of (A2) is that u : I 

R2þ-R viewed as a map from ðn; xÞ to real numbers is measurable as a function of
ðn; xÞ:
An allocation is any assignment x such that xnAR2þ; for all nAI : It is feasible if in
addition %x ¼ R xndn¼ R wndn: Prices are pAR2þ: We normalize prices so that p1 ¼ 1
and p2 ¼ p: At prices p; an individual solves the following maximization problem:
max
xAR2þ
unðxÞ s:t: x1 þ px2pwn1 þ pwn: ð1Þ
Under assumptions (A1)–(A2), it follows that for each pARþþ; there exists a
unique commodity bundle #xnðpÞ that solves the maximization problem (1). A
competitive equilibrium is a tuple ðpˆ; #xÞ of prices and a feasible allocation such that
given pˆ; #xnAR2þþ solves (1) for each nAI : Let C denote the set of competitive
equilibrium allocations.
There are two different models of non-cooperative exchange that we study in this
paper, simultaneous move market games and sequential move market games.
2.1. The simultaneous move market game
The exchange mechanism we study is due to [14]. Here all traders simultaneously
make bids and offers of commodities at the trading post where the two commodities
are exchanged. A strategy for a trader iAI1 is a bid of commodity 1; denoted by bi
while a strategy for a trader jAI2 is an offer of commodity 2; q j : The corresponding
set of strategies for each trader iAI1 is Si ¼ fbi : 0pbipwi1g while the strategy set of
trader jAI2 is S j ¼ fq j : 0pq jpw j2g: For each assignment of strategies s ¼ ðb; qÞ; at
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the trading post the market bid is B ¼ R
I1
bi di while the market offer is Q ¼ R
I2
q j dj:
Deﬁne the price at the trading post to be p ¼ B
Q
if Q40 with p ¼ 0 otherwise. For
each trader iAI1; the allocation rule determines commodity holdings as follows: if
pa0; xi1 ¼ wi1  bi and xi2 ¼ b
i
p; otherwise, x
i
l ¼ wil ; for l ¼ 1; 2: For each trader jAI2;
the allocation rule determines commodity holdings as follows: if pa0; x j1 ¼ q jp;
and x
j
2 ¼ w j2  q j ; otherwise, x jl ¼ w jl ; for l ¼ 1; 2: Using this allocation rule, by
substitution in the utility function, for each trader n; we have payoffs deﬁned as
follows. For each trader iAI1; the payoff over any strategy proﬁle s with B40 and
Q40 is given by uiðwi1  bi; b
i
pÞ: Similarly, for each trader jAI2; the payoff over any
strategy proﬁle s with B40 and Q40 is given by u jðq jp;w j2  q jÞ: A non-trivial
Nash equilibrium assignment of strategies is s if (i) the associated B and Q are
both strictly positive, (ii) for all iAI1; uiðwi1  bi; b
i
p ÞXuiðwi1  bi; b
i
pÞ; for all biASi
and (iii) for all jAI2; u jðqjp;w j2  qjÞXu jðq jp;w j2  q jÞ; for all q jAS j : In the
remainder of the paper we restrict attention to non-trivial Nash equilibria. Again, in
what follows we will refer directly to Nash equilibria, dropping the qualiﬁcation non-
trivial. Let N denote the set of Nash equilibrium allocations. The following lemma is
also direct consequence of [4] and is stated without proof.
Lemma 1. N ¼ C:
Lemma 1 allows us to refer to Nash equilibria or competitive equilibria
interchangeably. In the remainder of the paper, without confusion, we will use the
term market equilibria. Consider a market equilibrium assignment of strategies s
and prices p: Under assumptions (A1)–(A2), the following ﬁrst-order conditions
characterize the best-response of each individual:
for iAI1:  ui1 þ
1
p
ui2 ¼ 0; ð2aÞ
for jAI2:  u j2 þ pu j1 ¼ 0: ð2bÞ
Under assumptions (A1)–(A2) it follows that the best-response for each individual
is unique and a continuously differentiable function of p; for all pARþþ: For each
iAI1 (respectively, jAI2) and for all pARþþ; let biðpÞ (respectively, q jðpÞÞ denote the
best-response function implicitly deﬁned by the ﬁrst-order conditions. Note that for
deriving the results in our paper, we do not really require the boundary condition
stated in assumption (A1(ii)). We can replace the boundary condition in (A1(ii)) with
the alternative assumption ðA1ðiiÞ0Þ: there exists an open interval around some
equilibrium price p such that for all prices in this interval, the ﬁrst-order conditions
(2) characterize the optimal choices of individuals. Under ðA1ðiiÞ0Þ; it would follow
that the best-response for each individual is unique and a continuously differentiable
function of p in the vicinity of p: In the examples (see below, Sections 3 and 4) the
preferences of traders will in fact violate the boundary condition assumption (A1(ii))
but satisfy ðA1ðiiÞ0Þ:
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We conclude our description of the market game by noting that at each xAN; the
following equation must hold:R
I1
biðpÞ diR
I2
q jðpÞ dj ¼ p
: ð3Þ
At this stage, we point out that under our assumption of uniform smoothness,
we can differentiate under the integration sign to justify the expression B0ðpÞ ¼R
I1
bi
0 ðpÞ di for all pAðp  e; p þ eÞ (see [3, Theorem 13.8.6]). At several
other points in the paper, similar expressions will be used without explicit
justiﬁcation.
2.2. The sequential move market game
In this version of the market game, there are two stages. In stage 1, each trader
iAI1; makes a bid biASi: In stage 2, each jAI2 observes the resulting market bid
B ¼ R
I1
bi di and chooses an offer q jAS j; resulting in a market offer Q ¼ R
I2
q j dj:
The allocation rules are as in the simultaneous move version of the market game. Let
%B ¼ fBARþþ : B ¼
R
I1
bi di; for some assignment of bids bg: A strategy for jAI2; is an
offer function q˜ j : %B-S j: Let Q˜ j be the set of all strategies for each jAI2 with
Q˜ ¼ 
jAI2 Q˜ j : An assignment of offer functions, *q; is a map *qAQ˜ such that for each
BA %B; the integral
R
jAI2
*q jðBÞ dj exists. A non-trivial subgame perfect equilibrium is
an assignment ðb; *qÞ of bids and offer functions such that (i) B40 and Q ¼R
jAI2
*q j
 ðBÞ dj40; (ii) for each BA %B; for all jAI2; u jð*q j ðBÞ BR
jAI2
*q j
 ðBÞ dj; w
j
2 
*q j
 ðBÞÞXu jðq j BR
jAI2
*q j
 ðBÞ dj;w
j
2  q jÞ; for all q jAS j; (iii) for all iAI1; uiðwi1 
bi; b
i
p ÞXuiðwi1  bi; b
i
pÞ; for all biASi; where p ¼ B
R
jAI2
*q j
 ðBÞ dj: Throughout the paper,
we restrict attention to only those non-trivial subgame perfect equilibria that yields a
market equilibrium allocation. At a non-trivial subgame perfect equilibrium, for
each BA %B; there is an associated market offer Q40: Moreover, by deﬁnition, for
p ¼ B
Q
; the ﬁrst-order conditions (2b) have to be satisﬁed for each jAI2: In other
words, for each market bid BA %B; at a subgame perfect equilibrium, the associated
market offer Q must satisfy the equation Q ¼ R
jAI2
q jðB
Q
Þ dj ¼ R
jAI2
q jðpÞ dj; where
q jðpÞ is the implicit solution to the ﬁrst-order conditions (2b) for each jAI2: Consider
the quantity EqðpÞ ¼
R
I2
q j
0 ðpÞ dj
Q
: Remark that at a subgame perfect equilibrium Q ¼R
jAI2
q jðBQÞ dj: Suppose the subgame perfect equilibrium price p satisﬁes the
regularity condition pEqðpÞa 1: Direct computation shows that the total
derivative of
R
jAI2
q jðB
Q
Þ dj ¼ Q with respect to B and Q; evaluated at B and Q;
is given by ð1þ pEqðpÞÞ dQ ¼ EqðpÞ dB: Provided that pEqðpÞa 1; we
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obtain that dQ
dB
¼ EqðpÞð1þpEqðpÞÞ: By applying the implicit function theorem (and
the Lebesgue-dominated convergence theorem), it follows that for all BA½B 
E;B þ E in the vicinity of B there is a implicit solution to the equationR
jAI2
q jðB
Q
Þ dj ¼ Q denoted by QðBÞ: We summarize the above discussion by the
following result:
Lemma 2. Suppose the subgame perfect equilibrium price p satisfies the regularity
condition pEqðpÞa 1: Then, for all BA½B  E;B þ E in the vicinity of B there is a
implicit solution to the equation
R
jAI2
q jðB
Q
Þ dj ¼ Q denoted by QðBÞ:
Observe that, by setting *q jðBÞ ¼ q jð B
QðBÞÞ for each B40 and jAI2; at a
subgame perfect equilibrium, the ﬁrst-order conditions (2) must be satisﬁed.
The following lemma shows that (a) the use by each jAI2 of the dif-
ferentiable offer function *q jðBÞ in the vicinity of a market equilibrium bid B
is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the sequential market game and (b) that
such a subgame perfect equilibrium supports some market equilibrium
allocation x:
Lemma 3. Consider a market equilibrium allocation xAN and let B and Q be the
associated market equilibrium market bids and offers. Then, there exists for each jAI2;
a continuously differentiable offer function, given by *q jðBÞ that supports xAN as a
subgame perfect equilibrium allocation. Moreover, QðBÞ ¼ R
jAI2
*q jðBÞ dj is well-
defined and smooth in the vicinity of B:
3. Rationalizability and coordination in the simultaneous move market game
We begin by deﬁning local rationalizability in the simultaneous move market
game. We, then, provide a speciﬁcation of coordination dynamics with hetero-
geneous expectations and show that the local stability of the coordination dynamics
with heterogeneous expectations is equivalent to local rationalizability. Next, we
study conditions on preferences under which the coordination dynamics with
heterogeneous expectations simpliﬁes to coordination dynamics with homogenous
expectations and we study the connections between the latter and discrete-time
tatonnement dynamics.
Fix a market equilibrium price p with associated assignment of bids b and offers
q: For each iAI1; (respectively, jAI2) consider S˜i0CS
i such that bi

AS˜i0 while 0eS˜
i
0
(respectively, S˜
j
0CS
j such that q j

AS˜ j0 while 0eS˜
j
0 ). Let
*P0 ¼ pARþþ: 8iAI1; jAI2; (biAS˜i0; q jAS˜ j0 s:t: p ¼
R
I1
bi diR
I2
q j dj
( )
:
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For nX1; deﬁne the sequence of sets
S˜in ¼ bASi : (pA *Pn1 s:t: bAarg max
bASi
ui wi1  b;
b
p
  	
;
S˜ jn ¼ qAS j : (pA *Pn1 s:t: qAarg max
qAS j
u jðqp;w j2  qÞ
 	
;
*Pn ¼ pARþþ : 8iAI1; jAI2; (biAS˜in; q jAS˜ jn s:t: p ¼
R
I1
bi diR
I2
q j dj
( )
:
Then, the market equilibrium assignment of bids b and offers q is locally
rationalizable if and only if for some initial restrictions for each iAI1; (respectively,
jAI2Þ S˜i0CSi (respectively, S˜ j0CS j), for all iAI1;
T
nX0 S˜
i
n ¼ fbi
g while for all
jAI2;
T
nX0 S˜
j
n ¼ fq j
g: Although this deﬁnition of local rationalizability mimics
the deﬁnition of rationalizability in [9], it differs in two ways. One, it is a local
deﬁnition as the initial restrictions on strategies are required for each trader to lie in a
neighbourhood of their Nash equilibrium choice of bid or offer. Two, it restricts
attention to pure strategies. Observe that the market equilibrium assignment of bids
b and offers q is locally rationalizable if and only if
T
nX0
*Pn ¼ fpg:
Next, we consider coordination dynamics when agents have heterogeneous
expectations about the market price. Consider a market equilibrium price p and let
P0 ¼ ½
%
p; %p be an interval that contains p: While it is common knowledge that every
agent has deterministic beliefs over prices in P0; i.e each agent has a point
expectation of the market price denoted by pe;nA½
%
p; %p; no speciﬁc conﬁguration of
these possibly heterogenous expectations is common knowledge. Given a conﬁg-
uration of point expectations, fpe;n; nAIg; each iAI1 submits a bid biðpe;iÞ and each
jAI2 submits an offer q jðpe;jÞ: Formally, we only consider admissible conﬁgurations
of point expectations pe : I-½
%
p; %p which are ones such that the ratio
R
I1
biðpe;iÞ diR
I2
q jðpe;jÞ dj is
well deﬁned, i.e. each admissible pe generates a market price p according toR
I1
biðpe;iÞ diR
I2
q jðpe;jÞ dj ¼ p: ð4Þ
Performing this exercise for each admissible conﬁguration of point expectations
generates, using (4), a new set P1: In the next step, agents repeat the above process
for each admissible conﬁguration of market prices pe : I-P1; generating in turn, a
new set P2: Iterating this process generates a sequence of intervals of market prices
denoted by Pt and we study the conditions under which p is stable or unstable
under this coordination dynamics, i.e. the conditions under which PtCPtþ1 for all
t ¼ 1; 2;y; and TtX0 Pt ¼ fpg: Given our common knowledge assumptions,
remark that at each step t; tX1; of the coordination dynamics, the computation of
the interval Pt is not agent speciﬁc and can be performed by any one agent.
Note that if there exist non-trivial initial restrictions for each iAI1 (respectively,
jAI2Þ; S˜i0CSi (respectively, S˜ j0CS j), such that the market equilibrium assignment
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of bids b and offers q is locally rationalizable, there is some neighbourhood of
prices ½
%
p; %p around p such that the sequence of intervals of prices Pt; t ¼ 1; 2;y
with P0 ¼ ½
%
p; %p; generated by the coordination dynamics with heterogeneous
expectations shrinks to p: Now suppose that the market equilibrium assignment of
bids b and offers q is locally stable under the coordination dynamics with
heterogeneous expectations. Then, for each tX1; pAPt1; with *P0 ¼ P0; let
S˜it ¼ bASi : (pAPt1 s:t: bAarg max
bASi
ui wi1  b;
b
p
  	
;
S˜
j
t ¼ qAS j : (pAPt1 s:t: qAarg max
qAS j
u jðqp;w j2  qÞ
 	
:
Let *Pt ¼ fpARþþ: 8iAI1; jAI2; (biAS˜it; q jAS˜ jt s:t: p ¼
R
I1
bi diR
I2
q j dj
g: Remark that for
each tX1; Pt ¼ *Pt: As the sequence of sets of prices Pt; tX1; shrink to p; the
sequence of sets of prices *Pt also shrinks to p and therefore, for each iAI1; the
sequence of sets of bids S˜it; tX1; (respectively, each jAI2; the sequence of sets of
offers S˜
j
t ; tX1;) shrinks to b
i (respectively, qj). It follows that the market
equilibrium assignment of bids b and offers q are locally rationalizable. We
summarize the above discussion with the following proposition:7
Proposition 4. The coordination dynamics with heterogeneous expectations is locally
stable if and only if there exist non-trivial initial restrictions for each iAI1;
(respectively, jAI2Þ S˜i0CSi (respectively, S˜ j0CS j), such that the market equilibrium
assignment of bids b and offers q is locally rationalizable.
In order to facilitate the analysis, we need to make some additional assumptions
on utility functions of individuals. By direct computation, using the ﬁrst-order
conditions (2), we get that
for iAI1 : bi
0 ðpÞ ¼ u
i
2 þ ui22x2  biui12
p2ui11  2pui12 þ ui22
; ð5aÞ
for jAI2 : q j
0 ðpÞ ¼  u
j
1 þ u j11x1  q ju j12
p2u j11  2pu j12 þ u j22
: ð5bÞ
As the bordered hessian of utility evaluated at the optimum for each individual is
negative deﬁnite, the denominator in both (5a) and (5b) is negative. Further, we must
also have that for each iAI1; biX0 and for each jAI2; q jX0: It follows that for each
iAI1; the sign of bi
0 ðpÞ is the sign of ðui2 þ ui22x2  biui12Þ: Similarly, it follows that
for each jAI2; the sign of q j
0 ðpÞ is the sign of ðu j1 þ u j11x1  q ju j12Þ:
At prices p40 and commodity bundle xAR2þþ; let I
þ
1 ðp; xÞ denote the set of
agents in I1 such that u
i
2 þ ui22x2p0 and ui12X0: For agents in Iþ1 ðp; xÞ; bi
0 ðpÞX0 at
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the commodity bundle x: Similarly, let I1 ðp; xÞ denote the set of agents in I1 such
that ui2 þ ui22x2X0 and ui12p0 with at least one strict inequality. For agents in
I1 ðp; xÞ; bi
0 ðpÞo0 at the commodity bundle x: Analogously, for individuals in I2; at
prices p40 and commodity bundle xAR2þþ; we can also deﬁne I
þ
2 ðp; xÞ to be the set
of agents such that q j
0 ðpÞX0 at the commodity bundle x and I2 ðp; xÞ to be set of
individuals with q j
0 ðpÞo0 at the commodity bundle x: We now introduce an
assumption that will enable us to sign these derivatives. Formally, we have:
(A3). (i) If iAI1 ðp; xÞ at some p40 and xAR2þþ; then iAI1 ðp; xÞ for all p40 and
xAR2þþ: Let I

1 denote the collection of such individuals.
(ii) If iAIþ1 ðp; xÞ at some p40 and xAR2þþ; then iAIþ1 ðp; xÞ for all p40 and
xAR2þþ: Let I
þ
1 denote the collection of such individuals.
(iii) fI1 ; Iþ1 g is a partition of I1:
(iv) If jAI2 ðp; xÞ at some p40 and xAR2þþ; then jAI2 ðp; xÞ for all p40 and
xAR2þþ: Let I

2 denote the collection of such individuals.
(v) If jAIþ2 ðp; xÞ) at some p40 and xAR2þþ; then jAIþ2 ðp; xÞ for all p40 and
xAR2þþ: Let I
þ
2 denote the collection of such individuals.
(vi) fI2 ; Iþ2 g is a partition of I2:
Under assumption (A3), (a) for each iAIþ1 ; b
iðpÞ is weakly monotone over p40;
i.e. the sign of bi
0 ðpÞ is non-negative for all p40 and (b) for each iAI1 ; biðpÞ is
monotone over p40; i.e. the sign of bi
0 ðpÞ is negative for all p40: Similarly, under the
assumption (A3), (a) for each jAIþ2 ; q
jðpÞ is weakly monotone over p40; i.e. the sign
of q j
0 ðpÞ is non-negative for all p40 and (b) for each jAI2 ; q jðpÞ is monotone over
p40; i.e. the sign of q j
0 ðpÞ is negative for all p40: What assumption (A3) rules out is
the possibility that for some iAI1 (respectively, jAI2), the sign of bi
0 ðpÞ changes sign
over Rþþ (respectively, q j
0 ðpÞ changes sign over Rþþ).
Which kind of utility functions satisfy assumption (A3)? Consider individuals in
Iþ1 : When the utility function of each individual in I
þ
1 is assumed to be additively
separable over ðx1; x2Þ; i.e. there exists a representation of the form uiðx1; x2Þ ¼
viðx1Þ þ wiðx2Þ; for each iAIþ1 ; assumption (A3) requires that wi
0 þ wi00x2p0 for all
x240; and therefore  wi
00
x2
wi
0 X1 for all x240: As  wi
00
x2
wi
0 is the relative risk aversion
coefﬁcient, this is equivalent to requiring that the relative risk aversion coefﬁcient is
no less than 1. Some examples from the family of constant relative risk aversion
utility functions are now used to illustrate (A3). When wiðx2Þ ¼ ln x2;  wi
00
x2
wi
0 ¼ 1:
In this case, bi
0 ðpÞ ¼ 0: When wiðx2Þ ¼ x
1g
2
1g; ga1; then  w
i00x2
wi
0 ¼ g: Therefore, if
iAIþ1 ; assumption (A3) requires that g41: For the same class of utility functions, if
iAI1 ; assumption (A3) requires that go1: A similar interpretation can be given for
individuals belonging to I2 and I
þ
2 :
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Under assumption (A3), observe that the assignment of market prices pe : I-P0
that maximizes the value of the numerator in (4) is the one where pe;i ¼ %p for all iAIþ1
and pe;i ¼
%
p for all iAI1 : Similarly, the assignment of market prices p
e : I-P0 that
minimizes the value of the denominator in (4) is the one where pe;j ¼
%
p for all jAIþ2
and pe;j ¼ %p for all jAI2 : It follows that the ratio on the left-hand side of (4) attains
its maximum value for this assignment of expectations. Analogously, the assignment
of market prices pe : I-P0 that minimizes the value of the numerator in (4) is the
one where pe;i ¼
%
p for all iAIþ1 and p
e;i ¼ %p for all iAI1 : Similarly, the assignment of
market prices pe : I-P0 that maximizes the value of the denominator in (4) is the
one where pe;j ¼ %p for all jAIþ2 and pe;j ¼ %p for all jAI

2 : It follows that the ratio on
the left-hand side of (4) attains its minimum value for this assignment of
expectations. We can express the interval in terms of deviations from p as %p ¼
p þ e1 and
%
p ¼ p  e2 for some e140 and e240: Let e1;0 ¼ e1 and e2;0 ¼ e2: It
follows that the bounds of the sequence of intervals Pt; tX1; is generated by the
following iterative map, a two-dimensional difference equation system,
f1ðe1;t; e2;tÞ ¼
R
Iþ
1
biðp þ e1;tÞ di þ
R
I
1
biðp  e2;tÞ diR
Iþ
2
q jðp  e2;tÞ dj þ
R
I
2
q jðp þ e1;tÞ dj  p
 ¼ e1;tþ1; ð6aÞ
f2ðe1;t; e2;tÞ ¼ p 
R
Iþ
1
biðp  e2;tÞ di þ
R
I
1
biðp þ e1;tÞ diR
Iþ
2
q jðp þ e1;tÞ dj þ
R
I
2
q jðp  e2;tÞ dj ¼ e2;tþ1: ð6bÞ
What role does assumption (A3) play in our reduction of the coordination
dynamics with heterogeneous expectations to (6) in the vicinity of p? Remark that
when the preferences of individuals fail to satisfy (A3), there will be non-null sets of
agents whose best-responses are no longer monotone in prices. As a consequence, we
can no longer ensure that the value of the ratio in (4) is maximized by an assignment
of expectations constrained to lie on the bounds of the set P0: As stated, (A3) is a
global restriction on the preferences of individuals. Strictly speaking, for our
analysis, we can replace (A3) with the following (local) assumption ðA30Þ: there exists
a locally unique market equilibrium price p with the property that around p there is
an open set of prices such that the best-responses of all individuals are monotone and
continuously differentiable in that open set. Remark that our reduction of the
coordination dynamics with heterogeneous expectations to (6) will continue to apply in
the vicinity of a market equilibrium price p which satisﬁes ðA30Þ: We choose not to
make assumption ðA30Þ as ðA30Þ restricts both exogenous factors i.e. the fundamentals
of the economy, and endogenously determined variables i.e. market equilibria.
Next, we examine the conditions under which (6) is locally stable. At each tX1; in
the coordination dynamics deﬁned by (6), if we start with e140 and e240; e1;tX0
and e2;tX0: This is because at each tX1; the maximum (respectively, the minimum)
value of the ratio on the left-hand side of (4) is by construction, bounded below
(respectively, bounded above) by p: We are interested in the local stability of ð0; 0Þ
under (6) for initial conditions which start in the positive orthant and stay there.
Remark that under our assumptions, all ratios in (6) are continuously differentiable
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at p and hence (6) is itself continuously differentiable at ð0; 0Þ: It follows that for all
e1 and e2 (and in particular, e140 and e240) in the vicinity of ð0; 0Þ; the local
stability of ð0; 0Þ under (6) can be deduced from the eigenvalues of its Jacobian
evaluated at ð0; 0Þ: Given a market equilibrium price p we deﬁne the quantities
EbþðpÞ ¼
R
Iþ
1
bi
0 ðpÞ di
B (respectively, E
b
ðpÞ ¼
R
I
1
bi
0 ðpÞ di
B Þ; EqðpÞ ¼
R
I
2
q j
0 ðpÞ dj
Q (respec-
tively, EqþðpÞ ¼
R
Iþ
2
q j
0 ðpÞ di
Q Þ: Let D1 ¼ EbþðpÞ  EqðpÞ (respectively, D2 ¼ EqþðpÞ 
EbðpÞÞ: Then, direct computation shows that f11 ¼ pD1; f12 ¼ pD2; f21 ¼ pD2
and f22 ¼ pD1: It follows that characteristic polynomial of the dynamical system (6),
evaluated at the Nash equilibrium price p; is given by:
l2  2lpD1 þ ðpÞ2½ðD1Þ2  ðD2Þ2 ¼ 0: ð60Þ
By computation, it follows that ð60Þ has two distinct real solutions, l1 ¼
pðD1 þ D2Þ and l2 ¼ pðD2  D1Þ: The following proposition characterizes the local
stability of the coordination dynamics with heterogeneous expectations described by
(6). Given the preceding computation, the proof is a standard application of the
theory of discrete dynamical systems and is omitted.
Proposition 5. Assume preferences satisfy ðA3Þ: Consider a market equilibrium price
p: If both jl1jo1 and jl2jo1; there exists an interval ½
%
p; %p such that both the
sequences %pt ¼ p þ e1;t and
%
pt ¼ p  e2;t where ðe1;t; e2;tÞ is generated by the map (6),
converges to p: If either jl1j41 or jl2j41; there exists an interval ½
%
p; %p such that the
sequences %pt ¼ p þ e1;t;
%
pt ¼ p  e2;t where ðe1;t; e2;tÞ is generated by the map (6),
eventually leaves ½
%
p; %p:
It follows from Proposition 5 that a sufﬁcient condition for the local stability of (6)
is that jD2  D1j be close to zero and jD1j be small enough so that jl2j is close to zero
and jl1j less than one. For example, it can be immediately veriﬁed that when
preferences are such that all nAI have utility functions unðx1; x2Þ ¼ log x1 þ
log x2; b
iðpÞ ¼ q jðpÞ ¼ 1
2
for all pARþþ and therefore, bi
0 ðpÞ ¼ q j0 ðpÞ ¼ 0 for all
p40: By computation, it follows that l1 ¼ l2 ¼ 0 is the only solution to ð60Þ and
therefore, the coordination dynamics described by (6) converges in one step.
More generally, in order to interpret the conditions under which (6) is locally
stable, it is useful to consider a situation with homogenous expectations i.e. it is
common knowledge that pe;i ¼ peA½
%
p; %p such that pA½
%
p; %p: Then, (6) reduces toR
I1
biðpet Þ diR
I2
q jðpet Þ dj
¼ petþ1 ð7Þ
in the vicinity of p: As before, we are interested in ﬁnding out whether the sequence
of intervals of prices Pt; tX0; shrink to p: this is equivalent to requiring that the
discrete map deﬁned by (7) is locally stable. Given a market equilibrium price p we
deﬁne the quantities EbðpÞ ¼
R
I1
bi
0 ðpÞ di
B and E
qðpÞ ¼
R
I2
q j
0 ðpÞ dj
Q : We are now in a
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position to state the following proposition that characterises the conditions under
which the Nash equilibrium market price p is locally stable under the dynamics
deﬁned by (7). The proof is again an application of the local stability theory of one-
dimensional difference equations and is omitted.
Corollary 6. Consider a market equilibrium price p and consider the quantity a ¼
p½EbðpÞ  EqðpÞ: Then if jajo1; there exists an interval ½
%
p; %p such that given any
pe0A½
%
p; %p; the sequence pet generated by the map (7) converges to p: If jaj41; there
exists an interval ½
%
p; %p such that given any pe0A½ %p; %p; the sequence p
e
t generated by the
map (7) eventually leaves ½
%
p; %p:
Note that pEbðpÞ ¼ p
R
I1
bi
0 ðpÞ di
B ¼
R
I1
bi
0 ðpÞ di
B
p
is the elasticity of the market bids
with respect to the market price evaluated at the equilibrium price. It is a measure of
how responsive market bids are to market prices close to the equilibrium price.
Similarly, pEqðpÞ ¼ p
R
I2
qi
0 ðpÞ di
Q ¼
R
I2
qi
0 ðpÞ di
Q
p
the elasticity of the market offers with
respect to the market price evaluated at the equilibrium price. It is a measure of how
responsive market offers are to market prices close to the equilibrium price. The
quantity a is a measure of the difference in the response of the two sides of the
market to price changes in the vicinity of an equilibrium price. The condition jajo1
puts a bound on this difference between the elasticity of market bids and the
elasticity of market offers in the vicinity of an equilibrium.
Next, we compare the conditions under which the local stability obtains for
homogeneous expectations with the corresponding conditions under which local
stability obtains under heterogeneous expectations.
Proposition 7. Assume preferences satisfy ðA3Þ: Then ðiÞ jl1jXjaj while jl2j ¼ jaj; ðiiÞ
if mðI1 Þ ¼ mðIþ2 Þ ¼ 0; the dynamics described by (6) degenerates into a one-dimensional
map whose local stability coincides with (7); ðiiiÞ if mðIþ1 Þ ¼ mðI2 Þ ¼ 0; then jl1j ¼
jl2j ¼ jaj and although the dynamics described by (6) is two dimensional, the local
stability conditions coincide with that of (7); ðivÞ suppose either (a) mðIþ1 Þ40 and
mðI1 Þ40 or (b) mðI2 Þ40 and mðIþ2 Þ40 holds, then jl1j4jaj:
The preceding proposition shows that the local stability of (6) is, in general, more
demanding than the locally stability of (7).8 Note further that the conditions for local
stability for (6) and (7) coincide when both Iþ1 and I

2 are sets of measure zero. The
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following example,9 where mðIþ1 Þ ¼ mðI2 Þ ¼ 0; therefore demonstrates that the local
stability of (6) and (7) are both robust possibilities.
Example 8. Set I1 ¼ I2 ¼ ½0; 1 with wi ¼ ð1; 0Þ; uiðxÞ ¼ x1 þ xa2; 0oao1; for all
iAI1 and w j ¼ ð0; 1Þ; u jðxÞ ¼ x2 þ xb1 ; 0obo1; for all jAI2: From the ﬁrst-order
conditions we get that for all iAI1; bi ¼ a
1
a1p
a
a1 ¼ B; ebðpÞ ¼ apða1Þ while for all
jAI2; q j ¼ b
1
1bp
b
1b ¼ Q; eqðpÞ ¼ bpð1bÞ with p ¼ ½a
1
1a
b
1
1b

ð1bÞð1aÞ
1ab ; mðIþ1 Þ ¼ mðI2 Þ ¼
0 and jlj ¼ jaj ¼ ½ a
1aþ b1b: For instance, if a ¼ b; jaj ¼ j 2a1aj; if 0oao13; jajo1
while if 1
3
oao1; jaj41: More generally, as long as a
1a4
12b
1b ; 0oao1; 0obo1;
(6) and (7) are locally stable while if a
1ao
12b
1b ; (6) and (7) are locally unstable.
The following example however shows that the conditions under which (7) is
locally stable while (6) is locally unstable is also a robust possibility.
Example 9. Set I1 ¼ I2 ¼ ½0; 1: Partition I1 into two sets of equal measure I 01; I 001 :
For iAI 01; set w
i ¼ ð1; 0Þ and uiðxÞ ¼ x1 þ x
1a
2
1a; a41; while for iAI
00
1 ; set w
i ¼ ð1; 0Þ
and uiðxÞ ¼ x1 þ x
1g
2
1g; 0ogo1: For all jAI2; set w j ¼ ð0; 1Þ with u jðxÞ ¼ x2 þ
x1d
1
1d; 0odo1: From the ﬁrst-order conditions we get that for all iAI 01; bi ¼
p
a1
a ; bi
0 ¼ a1a p
1
a while for all iAI 001 ; b
i ¼ p
g1
g ; bi
0 ¼ g1g p
 1g; with B ¼ 1
2
ðpa1a Þ þ
1
2
ðp
g1
g Þ: For jAI2; from the ﬁrst-order conditions we get that q j ¼ p
1d
d ¼ Q and
q j
0 ¼ 1dd p
12d
d : It follows that I 01 ¼ Iþ1 while I 001 ¼ I1 and I2 ¼ Iþ2 : Market
equilibrium prices are given by the solutions to the equation p ¼ f ðpÞ ¼ BðpÞ
QðpÞ ¼
1
2
ðp
a1
a þp
g1
g
p
1d
d
Þ: Evidently, p ¼ 1 is a solution to this equation and as long as a1a þ
g1
g þ d1d a0; it is also locally unique. At p ¼ 1; jaj ¼ ja1a þ g1g þ d1d j while jl1j ¼
ja1a þ 1gg þ 1dd j: For instance, when a ¼ 3; g ¼ 12; d ¼ 34; jaj ¼ 23o1 while jl1j ¼
241; implying that although (7) is locally stable, (6) fails to be locally stable.
Further, both a and l (and therefore, jaj and jlj) are continuous in a; g; and d: It
follows that the above property is robust to small perturbations in the utility
parameters a; g; and d:
ARTICLE IN PRESS
9At this stage, we remind the reader that all examples in this section and the following section satisfy
ðA1ðiiÞ0Þ and not ðA1ðiiÞÞ:
S. Chatterji, S. Ghosal / Journal of Economic Theory 114 (2004) 255–279 269
Finally, the following remark makes a link between (7) and discrete-time
tatonnement.
Remark 10. Fix a market equilibrium price p: The classical discrete-time
tatonnement dynamics (see for instance, [7, pp. 233–235]), in the vicinity of p; is
described by the map
ptþ1 ¼ pt þ g
Z
I
xn2ð1; ptÞ dn  %w2
 
; g40: ð8Þ
Although the choice of g the speed of adjustment of the discrete-time tatonnement
dynamics is arbitrary and cannot be pinned down by specifying the fundamentals of
the economy, Hildenbrand and Kirman [7] point out that diminishing the
adjustment speed g smooths out the price path generated by iterated applications
of the map (8). From the allocation rules, we obtain that
R
I
xn2ð1; ptÞ dn  %w2 ¼
1
pt
ðR
I1
biðptÞ di  pt
R
I2
q jðptÞ djÞ: Using this expression, the right-hand side of (8) can
be rewritten as sðpt; gÞ ¼ pt þ gptð
R
I1
biðptÞ di  pt
R
I2
q jðptÞ djÞ: By computation,
observe that s0ðp; gÞ ¼ 1þ gQp ða  1Þ: It follows that if a41; for all
g40; s0ðp; gÞ41 while if ao1; there exits %g40 such that if go%g; js0ðp; gÞjo1:
Moreover, if g ¼ p
Q; the local stability of (8) coincides with the local stability of (7).
For an arbitrary choice of g; local stability under (7) does not imply or rule out the
local stability of (8).
4. Coordination in the sequential move market game
We restrict attention to only those subgame perfect equilibria that support market
equilibrium allocations and study a coordination problem that is faced by the agents
who move in the ﬁrst stage of the sequential game. At a subgame perfect equilibrium,
agents iAI1 anticipate correctly the market offer resulting from the strategies of jAI2:
We ask what happens when the expected market bid for all iAI1 is not equal to the
subgame perfect equilibrium market bid. Speciﬁcally, we assume that it is common
knowledge that all individual agent’s expected market bid lies in some interval that
contains exactly one subgame perfect equilibrium market bid. We make the
assumption that each iAI1 anticipates correctly that all jAI2 make offers according
to *q j

: We, then, construct a speciﬁc dynamic process, based on the best-response
functions of iAI1; that generates an iterated sequence of such intervals. We
investigate conditions under which such a sequence converges to the subgame perfect
equilibrium market bid. In Section 4.1 we study the case with homogeneous
expectations while in Section 4.2 we study the case with heterogeneous expectations.
Throughout this section, we restrict attention to subgame perfect equilibria which (a)
satisfy the regularity condition pEqðpÞa 1 at the subgame perfect equilibrium
price p and (b) supports some market equilibrium allocation x:
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4.1. Stage 1 coordination dynamics
It worth noting that there are assignments of subgame perfect equilibrium
strategies for which there will always be a coordination problem in stage 1. For
instance, consider the following knife-edge strategies, where at stage 2, the offer
function of each jAI2; has the form: *qj ¼ Q if B ¼ B; otherwise *q j ¼ 0: Under the
allocation rules of the market game with a continuum of players, as in our
formulation, this assignment of strategies supports p ¼ BR
jAI2
*qj dj
¼ B
Q; where p
 is a
competitive equilibrium price, as a subgame perfect equilibrium price. However,
observe that with these strategies, there will always be a coordination problem in
stage 1. If traders in stage 1 expect that the market bid Be is different from B; they
anticipate that the response of traders in the second stage of the game will be to set
*q j
 ¼ 0 for all jAI2; resulting in ﬁnal allocations equal to their initial endowments. It
follows that the only best-response for each iAI1; is to put bi ¼ 0: But, then, traders
will never converge back to B: Therefore, in order to admit the possibility of
coordination in stage 1, we restrict ourselves to assignments of subgame perfect
equilibrium strategies where, in stage 2, traders submit offer functions that are
locally continuously differentiable in the market bid.
Let ðB; *qÞ denote a subgame perfect equilibrium and let ½
%
B; %B be an interval that
contains B: We assume that all agents expect the same market price Be0A½
%
B; %B:
Given Be0; each iAI1 submits a bid b
ið Be0R
jAI2
*q j
 ðBe
0
Þ djÞ; which in turn generates a new
market bid for each t40 denoted by Bet according toZ
iAI1
bi
BetR
jAI2
*q j
 ðBet Þ dj
 !
di ¼ Betþ1: ð9Þ
We study the dynamics generated by the iterative map given by (9). As discussed
immediately after Lemma 2, we set *q j
 ðBÞ ¼ q jð B
QðBÞÞ: Therefore, for the purpose of
studying local coordination dynamics around subgame perfect equilibria that
support competitive equilibrium allocations, we can replace *q j
 ðBÞ by q jð B
QðBÞÞ in (9).
Further, as we must have
R
jAI2
q jð BQðBÞÞ dj ¼ QðBÞ for all BA½B  E;B þ E for some
E40; we can replace (9) with ð90Þ:Z
iAI1
bi
Bet
QðBet Þ
 
di ¼ Betþ1: ð90Þ
Given a subgame perfect equilibrium price p we deﬁne the quantity a˜ ¼ pEbðpÞ
1þpEqðpÞ:
It can be veriﬁed by direct computation that the derivative of the map ð90Þ evaluated
at p is the quantity a˜: We are now in a position to state the following proposition
that characterizes the conditions under which the subgame perfect equilibrium
market bid B is locally stable under the dynamics deﬁned by ð90Þ: As in Section 3,
with homogenous expectations, the shrinking of intervals depends on the stability of
ARTICLE IN PRESS
S. Chatterji, S. Ghosal / Journal of Economic Theory 114 (2004) 255–279 271
(9). Again, the proof is a standard application of the local stability theory of one-
dimensional difference equations and is omitted.
Proposition 11. Consider a subgame perfect equilibrium market bid B and price p: If
ja˜jo1; there exists an interval ½
%
B; %B such that given any Be0A½
%
B; %B; the sequence Bet
generated by the map ð90Þ converges to B: If ja˜j41; there exists an interval ½
%
B; %B such that
given any Be0A½
%
B; %B; the sequence Bet generated by the map ð90Þ eventually leaves ½
%
B; %B:
Next, we compare the conditions under which the coordination dynamics in the
simultaneous move market game, described by (7), is locally stable, to the conditions
under which the coordination dynamics in the sequential move market game,
described by ð90Þ; is locally stable.
Proposition 12. Assume preferences satisfy ðA3Þ: ðiÞ If jajo1 and mðIþ1 Þ ¼ mðI2 Þ ¼ 0;
then ja˜jo1; ðiiÞ If jajo1 and mðI1 Þ ¼ mðIþ2 Þ ¼ 0; then ja˜jo1:
The following example shows, under the same assumptions of the preceding
proposition, it is a robust possibility that ð90Þ is locally stable while (7) is locally unstable.
Example 13. Consider the same economy as in Example 8: Observe that mðIþ1 Þ ¼
mðI2 Þ ¼ 0; while ja˜j ¼ að1bÞð1aÞo½ a1aþ b1b ¼ jaj as 0obo1: If b412; jaj41 while
ao 1
2b; ja˜jo1:
What happens when both sides of the market behave in the same way, i.e. when
both market bids and market offers are increasing in market prices or when both
market bids and market offers are decreasing in market prices? The following
example shows that it is a robust possibility that ð90Þ may be locally unstable, while
(7) may be locally stable.
Example 14. Set I1 ¼ I2 ¼ ½0; 1: For iAI1; let wi ¼ ð1; 0Þ and uiðxÞ ¼ x1 þ
x1a
2
1a; 0oao1; while for jAI2; set w j ¼ ð0; 1Þ with u jðxÞ ¼ x2 þ
x1d
1
1d; d41: From
the ﬁrst-order conditions we get that for all iAI1; bi ¼ p
a1
a ¼ B; bi0 ¼ a1a p
1
a: For
jAI2 we get that q j ¼ p
1d
d ¼ Q and q j0 ¼ 1dd p
12d
d : It follows that I1 ¼ I1 and
I2 ¼ I2 : Therefore, both market bids and market offers are decreasing in the market
price p: There is a unique market equilibrium price p ¼ 1: A computation shows
that at a ¼ a1a  1dd while a˜ ¼
ða1a Þ
1þð1dd Þ
: Observe that when a1a ¼ 1dd (equivalently,
when 2ad a d ¼ 0Þ; a ¼ 0 and (7) is locally stable. Under the same condition,
however, when for instance, a ¼ 3
5
; a˜ ¼ 2; ja˜j41; implying that ð90Þ is locally
unstable. Further, as both a and a˜ and therefore, jaj and ja˜j) are continuous in a and
d; this property is robust to small perturbations in the utility parameters a and d:
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4.2. Coordination and local extensive-form rationalizability
Here, we study the link between the coordination dynamics in the market game
with sequential moves and extensive-form rationalizability. In addition to assump-
tions (A1) and (A2), we will ﬁnd it convenient to assume (A3) as well. A preliminary
complication that we need to deal with arises from the fact that, as stated, the
coordination dynamics described by ð90Þ applies only to the case with homogeneous
expectations. Let ðB; *qÞ denote a subgame perfect equilibrium and let ½
%
B; %B be an
interval that contains B: As before, we assume that it is common knowledge that
every trader in I1 has some point expectation of the market bid denoted by
Be;iA½
%
B; %B: Remark that in the sequential market game, all traders jAI2 observe the
same market bid resulting from stage 1. As this fact is common knowledge for all
traders in stage 1, it follows that given a conﬁguration of market bids fBe;i : iAI1g;
each iAI1 submits a bid bið Be;iR
jAI2
*q j
 ðBe;iÞ djÞ: As before, we only consider admissible
conﬁgurations fBe;i : iAI1g such that
R
iAI1
bið Be;iR
jAI2
*q j
 ðBe;iÞ djÞ di is well-deﬁned i.e. each
admissible fBe;i : iAI1g generates, in analogy with (4), a new market bid for each t40
denoted by B according to
Z
iAI1
bi
Be;iR
jAI2
*q j
 ðBe;iÞ dj
 !
di ¼ B: ð10Þ
As before, using Lemma 2, we must have
R
jAI2
q jð B
QðBÞÞ dj ¼ QðBÞ for all BA½ %B;
%B:
Therefore, for all BA½
%
B; %B; we can replace (10) with ð100Þ:Z
iAI1
bi
Be;i
QðBe;iÞ
 
di ¼ B: ð100Þ
In what follows, we assume that mðIþ1 Þ ¼ mðI2 Þ ¼ 0 which implies that EqðpÞ40
and bi
0 ðpÞo0 for all iAI1; for all p in the vicinity of p: Therefore, dbidB ¼ pE
bðpÞ
ð1þpEqðpÞÞ for
all p in the vicinity of p: It immediately follows that
R
iAI1
bið B
e;i
t
QðBe;it Þ
Þ di is maximized
by setting Be;i ¼
%
B and minimized by setting Be;i ¼ %B: As before, we express the
interval in terms of deviations from B as %B ¼ B þ e1 and B ¼ B  e2 for some
e140 and e240: Let e1;0 ¼ e1 and e2;0 ¼ e2: It follows that the bounds of the sequence
of intervals ½
%
Bt; %Bt; tX1; is generated by the following iterative map, a two-
dimensional difference equation system,
f˜1ðe1;t; e2;tÞ ¼
Z
iAI1
bi
B  e2;t
QðB  e2;tÞ
 
di  B ¼ e1;tþ1; ð11aÞ
f˜2ðe1;t; e2;tÞ ¼ B 
Z
iAI1
bi
B þ e1;t
QðB þ e1;tÞ
 
di ¼ e2;tþ1: ð11bÞ
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By computation, the characteristic polynomial of the dynamical system (11),
evaluated at the Nash equilibrium price p; is given by
n2 ¼ p
EbðpÞ
1þ pEqðpÞ
 2
: ð110Þ
But, then, jnj ¼ ja˜j: We summarize this discussion as the following lemma.
Lemma 15. Assume preferences satisfy ðA3Þ: Then, if mðIþ1 Þ ¼ mðI2 Þ ¼ 0; then jnj ¼
ja˜j and although the coordination dynamics under heterogeneous expectations given by
(11a) and (11b) is two dimensional, the local stability conditions are the same as in the
case with homogeneous expectations given by ð90Þ:
Next, we compare the coordination dynamics deﬁned by ð90Þ to local extensive-
form rationalizability. Fix a subgame perfect equilibrium market bid and assignment
of offer functions. Heuristically, local extensive-form rationalizability requires that
(a) for every market bid in the vicinity of the subgame perfect equilibrium market
bid, type 2 traders are able to coordinate on the assignment of subgame perfect
equilibrium offer functions and (b) given that type 2 traders are choosing offer
functions that ‘‘close’’ (in an appropriately chosen topology, see appendix for
details) to their subgame perfect equilibrium offer functions, type 1 traders are able
to coordinate on the subgame perfect equilibrium market bid. A formal deﬁnition of
local extensive-form rationalizability is postponed to the appendix. For the moment,
we note that our deﬁnition of local extensive-form rationalizability differs from the
deﬁnition of extensive-form rationalizability in [9] in two ways. One, it is a local
deﬁnition as the initial restrictions on strategies are required for each trader to lie in a
neighbourhood of their subgame perfect equilibrium strategy assignments. Two, it
restricts attention to pure strategies. The following corollary compares the
coordination dynamics deﬁned by ð90Þ to local extensive-form rationalizability
under the assumption that mðIþ1 Þ ¼ mðI2 Þ ¼ 0: It shows that whenever the subgame
perfect equilibrium ðb; *qÞ is locally extensive-form rationalizable, the coordination
dynamics described by (11) (and hence, (9)) converges.
Corollary 16. Suppose ðA1Þ–ðA3Þ is satisfied and mðIþ1 Þ ¼ mðI2 Þ ¼ 0: Fix a subgame
perfect equilibrium ðb; *qÞ with p the associated market price. Then, if there exist
non-trivial initial restrictions for each iAI1; (respectively, jAI2ÞS˜i0 (respectively, Q˜ jS;0),
such that the subgame perfect equilibrium ðb; *qÞ is locally extensive-form
rationalizable, then there is some neighbourhood ½
%
B; %B around B such that the
sequence generated by the coordination dynamics ð90Þ converges to B:
The intuition for this result is as follows. Local extensive-form rationalizability
implies that in stage 1, agents have to converge to b even when they anticipate that
agents in stage 2 are using any assignment of offer functions that are in the vicinity
(in an appropriate chosen topology, see appendix for details) of the subgame perfect
ARTICLE IN PRESS
S. Chatterji, S. Ghosal / Journal of Economic Theory 114 (2004) 255–279274
equilibrium assignment of offer functions *q: In particular, this implies that in stage
1, agents are able to converge to b when they anticipate that in stage 2 agents use the
subgame perfect equilibrium assignment of offer functions *q: The result
immediately follows.
Establishing the converse of the preceding corollary is more problematic. In fact, it
can be shown that10 the common knowledge restrictions implied by the coordination
dynamics (11) (and hence, ð90ÞÞ are stronger than the corresponding common-
knowledge restrictions implied by local extensive-form rationalizability.
4.3. Coordination and cobweb dynamics
In our set-up, for traders in I1 at all positive prices p;
11 the optimal choice of
commodity bundles imply an excess supply of commodity 1 and an excess demand
for commodity 2; reciprocally, for traders in I2 at all positive prices p; the optimal
choice of commodity bundles imply an excess supply of commodity 2 and an excess
demand for commodity 1: Therefore, traders in I1 supply commodity 1 while traders
in I2 demand commodity 1 and traders in I1 demand commodity 1 while traders in I2
supply commodity 1: It follows that there are two separate possibilities for the study
of cobweb dynamics. The classical model of cobweb dynamics is one where supply
reacts to changes in prices only after a given time lag while prices themselves adjust
instantaneously to equate the quantity supplied to demand. For l ¼ 1; 2; let %xl;t ¼
Slðpt1Þ ¼ DlðptÞ denote the market quantities traded at the t–th iteration of the
cobweb dynamics in the market for commodity l; where SlðptÞ (respectively, DlðptÞ)
denotes the market excess supply for commodity l (respectively, market excess
demand for commodity l). Let %xlðpˆÞ denote the excess demand (equivalently, excess
supply) of commodity l at a competitive equilibrium price pˆ: Then, the map
describing the cobweb dynamics12 in the market for commodity l; l ¼ 1; 2; in the
vicinity of the competitive equilibrium excess demand, is given by
ð %xl;t  %xlðpˆÞÞ ¼ S
0
lðpˆÞ
D0lðpˆÞ
ð %xl;t1  %xlðpˆÞÞ: ð80Þ
Evidently, the local stability of the cobweb dynamics in the market for commodity
l is determined by the absolute value of the ratio
S0
l
ðpˆÞ
D0
l
ðpˆÞ: Using the allocation rules, a
direct computation shows that jS01ðpÞ
D01ðpÞ
j ¼ j pEbðpÞ
1þpEqðpÞj ¼ ja˜j: The following corollary
summarizes the preceding discussion.
Corollary 17. Fix a market equilibrium assignment of allocation x and price p: Then,
the cobweb dynamics ð80Þ is locally stable if and only if the coordination dynamics
described by ð90Þ is locally stable.
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12The speciﬁcation of the cobweb dynamics follows [13, pp. 265].
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In the sequential move market game the coordination dynamics described by ð90Þ
requires traders in I1 to solve a simultaneous move coordination problem,
anticipating that traders in I2 submit offers according to the function QðBÞ: This
is consistent with the sequence of moves implicit in the description of the cobweb
dynamics in the market for commodity 1:
Remark 18. The above corollary provides a strategic foundation for the stability
analysis in [6]. In the cobweb dynamics for the market for commodity l; l ¼ 1; 2;
supply adjusts only after a one-period time lag while prices adjust instantaneously to
clear the market. This adjustment process requires that the supply side of the market
moves before the demand side of the market. Guesnerie [6] studied the coordination
problem for competitive suppliers, who face an exogenous demand curve, and who
have to decide on the quantity they choose to supply before prices adjust to clear the
market. He showed that the stability of the coordination dynamics studied by him
(deﬁned as eductive stability) coincided with that of the cobweb dynamics. In our
setup, the dynamics described by ð90Þ corresponds to the sequential market game
where type 1 traders choose their bids (equivalently, the quantity they choose to
supply of commodity 1) and the behaviour of type 2 traders is summarized by the
market offer curve. Applying the deﬁnition of eductive stability to the market for
commodity 1; would, then, yield the same (local) stability analysis as the
coordination dynamics described by ð90Þ: Evidently, the analysis of the dynamics
studied by eductive stability is very different from the local stability of the
coordination dynamics in the simultaneous-move market game studied by (4).
5. Conclusion and a discussion of possible extensions
We reformulate the stability analysis of competitive equilibria as a coordination
problem in a market game whose non-cooperative equilibria coincide with
competitive equilibria. In the market game, the map which associates market prices
to the best-responses of all traders is common knowledge and is well-deﬁned both in
and out of equilibrium. Initial beliefs over market variables, like prices, differ from
the equilibrium values of the same market variables. This creates a coordination
problem as traders use the structure of the game to converge back to equilibrium. We
derive and study the resulting coordination dynamics in both simultaneous and
sequential move versions of the market game and are able to link, in a common
framework, the local stability analysis of discrete-time tatonnement (respectively,
cobweb dynamics) with local rationalizability (respectively, local extensive-form
rationalizability). Several open questions remain which we intend to pursue in future
research: (1) extending the analysis of coordination dynamics to stochastic beliefs;
(2) the generalization of our analysis of coordination to more than two commodities
and continuous time: with three or more commodities and continuous time, we can
study better the link with tatonnement stability; (3) the study of coordination
dynamics in large ﬁnite economies and relating it to the coordination dynamics in the
limit case studied by us here.
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Appendix A
A.1. Proofs of propositions
Proof of Proposition 7. (i) By comparing the expressions for a; D1 and D2; it follows
that jpðD2  D1Þj ¼ jaj: Therefore, jl2j ¼ jaj: As jl1j ¼ jpðD2 þ D1Þj; as both D1X0
and D2X0;
jpðD2 þ D1ÞjXjpðD2  D1Þj ¼ jaj:
(ii) As mðI1 Þ ¼ mðIþ2 Þ ¼ 0; observe that the ratio in the middle equality of (6a) is
equal to the ratio on the left-hand side of (7) when pe0 ¼ %p: Similarly, the ratio in the
middle equality of (6b) is equal to the ratio on the left-hand side of (7) when pe0 ¼ %p:
This implies that the coordination dynamics described by (6a) and (6b) degenerates
to the corresponding coordination dynamics given by (7) when jaja1:
(iii) When mðIþ1 Þ ¼ mðI2 Þ ¼ 0; D1 ¼ 0: Therefore, jl1j ¼ jl2j ¼ jD2pj ¼ jaj:
(iv) When either condition (a) or condition (b) holds, we must have either D140 or
D240 or both, which, in turn, implies that jðD2 þ D1Þpj4jaj and therefore,
jl1j4jaj: &
Proof of Proposition 12. As a˜ ¼ pEbðpÞ1þpEqðpÞ; it follows that %D ¼ a˜  a ¼ p
EqðpÞ
1þpEqðpÞ½1 a:
We want to check that jajo1 implies that ja˜jo1 as well. Suppose (i) holds where, by
assumption, mðIþ1 Þ ¼ mðI2 Þ ¼ 0: Then, EbðpÞo0 while EqðpÞ40: It follows that
ao0; a˜o0 which in turn implies that %D40 and therefore, a˜4a or ja˜jojaj and
therefore, if jajo1; then ja˜jo1: Now, suppose (ii) holds where, by assumption,
mðI1 Þ ¼ mðIþ2 Þ ¼ 0: It follows that EbðpÞ40 while EqðpÞo0: This implies that a40:
There are two sub-cases to consider: (a) where 1þ pEqðpÞo0 and (b) where 1þ
pEqðpÞ40: When (a) obtains, pEqðpÞ41; and as EbðpÞ40; a41; which
contradicts the assumption that jajo1: When (b) obtains, we have pEqðpÞo1;
and as ao1; we have a˜40; %Do0; a˜oa and therefore, ja˜jo1: &
A.2. The definition of (local) extensive-form rationalizability
As in Section 4, we restrict attention to subgame perfect equilibria which (a) satisfy
the regularity condition pEqðpÞa 1 at the subgame perfect equilibrium price p
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and (b) supports some market equilibrium allocation x: For each iAI1; consider
S˜i0CS
i such that bi

AS˜i0 with S˜
i
0 as in the deﬁnition of local rationalizability. It
follows that there exists an interval ½
%
B; %B around B such that BA *B0 ¼ ½
%
B; %B if and
only if B ¼ R
I1
bi di for some assignment b : I1-
iAI1 S˜i0: For the purposes of
deﬁning (local) extensive-form rationalizability, without loss of generality, we may
restrict the strategy space of each jAI2; to be continuously differentiable offer
functions q˜ j : *B0-S
j with Q˜
j
S the set of all strategies for each jAI2 and Q˜S ¼

jAI2 Q˜ jS: At a subgame perfect equilibrium ðB; *qÞ; each trader jAI2 is choosing a
continuously differentiable offer function *q j
 ðBÞ ¼ q jð B
QðBÞÞ where
R
jAI2
q jð B
QðBÞÞ dj ¼
QðBÞ for all B in the vicinity of B: Let Q˜ jS be the set of all continuously
differentiable offer functions that are feasible for each jAI2: We endow the set Q˜
j
S
with the topology of C1 uniform convergence on compacta for each jAI2: Remark
that as *B0 is compact, this is equivalent to the C
1-topology.13 Let Q˜S ¼ 
jAI2 Q˜ jS: An
assignment of continuously differentiable offer functions is *q; *qAQ˜S; such that for
each B in the vicinity of B; the integral
R
jAI2
*q jðBÞ dj ¼ *QðBÞ exists and moreover,
*Q0ðBÞ ¼ R
jAI2
*q j
0 ðBÞ dj: In the norm associated with the C1-topology, let Q˜ jSð*q j

; EÞ
denote the set of all continuously differentiable offer functions that lie within a E-
neighbourhood of *q j

for each jAI2: Let Q˜
j
S;0CQ˜
j
Sð*q j
0; EÞ for some E40 denote an
initial restriction on the set of offer functions for each jAI2: For each BA *B0 and each
assignment of continuously differentiable offer functions is *q; *qAQ˜S;0 ¼ 
jAI2 Q˜ jS;0;
there corresponds a market offer *QðBÞ ¼ R
jAI2
*q jðBÞ dj: Moreover, as we are using
the norm associated with the C1-topology to deﬁne neighbourhoods, for every
d140; d240; for each BA *B0; there exists E40 such that if for all
jAI2; *q jAQ˜
j
Sð*q j

; EÞ; then j *QðBÞ QðBÞjod1 and j *Q0ðBÞ Q0 ðBÞjod2: For each
BA *B0; let *Q0ðBÞ ¼ fQARþþ : ( an assignment of continuously differentiable functions
*q; *qAQ˜S;0; s.t. Q ¼
R
jAI2
*q jðBÞ djg: For nX1; given BA *B0; let QnðBÞ ¼
fQARþþ : Q ¼
R
jAI2
q jðB
Q
Þ dj for some QA *Qn1ðBÞg; Q˜S;nþ1 ¼ f*qAQ˜S : (QAQnðBÞ
such that Q ¼ R
jAI2
*q jðBÞ dj; for some assignment *q: I2-QnðBÞg: For each assign-
ment of continuously differentiable offer functions *q; *qAQ˜S;0; and an assignment of
#BiA *B0; for nX1; let S˜in ¼ fbASi : ( an assignment of continuously differentiable
functions *q; *qAQ˜S;0; s:t: *Qð #BiÞ ¼
R
jAI2
*q jð #BiÞ dj and b ¼ bið #Bi*Qð #BiÞÞg; *Bn ¼
fBA %B : (B ¼ R
I1
bi di for some assignment b : I1-
iAI1 S˜ing:
Deﬁnition 19. The subgame perfect equilibrium ðb; *qÞ is locally extensive-form
rationalizable if for initial non-trivial restrictions on strategy spaces S˜i0 for iAI1 and
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Q˜
j
S;0 for jAI2 (with the associated sets *B0; Q˜S;0;Q0ðBÞ for each BA *B0Þ;
T
nX0 S˜
i
n ¼
fbig; TnX0 Q˜ jS;n ¼ f*qjg for each iAI1 and jAI2:
Proof of Corollary 16. As the subgame perfect equilibrium ðb; *qÞ is locally
extensive-form rationalizable, consider the initial restriction Q˜0S;0 ¼ f*qg and B00 ¼
*B0: Remark that Q˜
0
S;0CQ˜S;0 and therefore, at each nX1; and for each iAI1; S˜
0i
n ¼
fbASi: b ¼ bið #Bi
Qð #BiÞÞ and #BiAB
0
n1g and *B0n ¼ fBA %B : (B ¼
R
I1
bi di for some assign-
ment b : I1-
iAI1 S˜0ing are such that S˜0inCS˜in and *B0nC *Bn: As the sequence of sets S˜in
and *Bn shrink to b
i for all iAI1 and B respectively, it follows that the sequence of
sets S˜0in and *B
0
n shrink to b
i for all iAI1 and B respectively as well. Therefore, both
the dynamics deﬁned by (11) and ð90Þ on ½
%
B; %B converges to B: &
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